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## OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

21 MAY 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAVE BRANDWINE, CIA

SUBJECT: MIRV Ban Verification

The following is the statement from the DSB Arms Control Report that Dan Fink read to the Steering Committee on Wednesday, May 14.

"It is clear that accuracy cannot be controlled, but in principal MIRV could. The Task Force took the position that if there were effective controls on ABM systems, a prohibition of MIRV would be a useful stabilizing factor. On the other hand, if the only serious limit on MIRV deployment is through the control of ICBM missile flight testing, the Task Force believes that this means of controlling MIRV is unsatisfactory for several reasons:

- "a. There are too many ways that MIRV could be developed using flight test techniques that could not be unilaterally monitored. Many questions remain to be answered on the verification of MIRV development requiring inputs from the technologist in addition to the intelligence community.
- "b. Any meaningful flight test ban of MIRV would have to include a prohibition on penetration aids testing since such testing would obscure MIRV tests. The Task Force believes that any ABM system control will leave uncertainties regarding the upgrading of air defense systems such as TALLINN. The continued development and deployment of penetration aids is necessary as a hedge against any such covert increase in levels of ABM defenses.

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"c. Control of flight testing would be fraught with false alarms which would erode confidence in the agreement. false alarms would result from almost any testing activity including that of tactical or space vehicles."

Roland Herbst

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